Three stories
Proven on freight, where payment-redirect fraud is worst.
Three seeded loads run end to end through the same path: documents in, decision out, approval by a different human, payment status that never lies.
L-2041 · Ridgeline■ HOLD R2
policy payeeF-01 Meridian
requestedcarrier C-301
NOA effective2026-03-02
email "updated banking"unverified
escalationdrafted → factor
Redirect■ Hold
June invoice vs. March NOA
A June invoice and an "updated banking" email ask us to pay the carrier directly. A verified March assignment says the factor. An unverified email cannot replace a verified payment instruction.
Open L-2041 on the board →
L-2037 · Blue Mesa · re-bill■ HOLD R3
existing obligationINV-5521 · reserved
new invoiceINV-5521-R
concurrent requests2 → 1 reserved · 1 refused
refusalcommitted to decision_log
Duplicate■ Hold
Same load, new invoice number
Two requests race for the same load. Unique indexes inside one transaction leave exactly one reservation. The loser's refusal is a committed audit row, not an exception.
Open the re-bill on the board →
L-2037 · Blue Mesa□ APPROVED
rate con$1,850.00
invoice$1,850.00 · INV-5521
PODsigned · Jun 9
requested byagent
approved bycontroller · not requester
Clean□ Approved
Match, request, approve, submit
Invoice matches rate con and POD. The agent requests; a different human approves; the runner submits with a persisted idempotency key. Status moves to submitted, then simulated_settled, live.
Open L-2037 on the board →